To cite this work: Ling, Katy. (2019). “How Effective Were British Intelligence in Tackling the IRA in Northern Ireland”, KatyLing.com. 

P.S - Please don't plagiarise this essay... Turnitin will flag it if you do! ​

How have post-colonial conflicts in Africa been shaped by the need to finance them?

Since the expulsion of colonial powers in Africa throughout the second half of the twentieth-century, war, particularly civil war, has become a predominant feature in the newly-independent states. Around sixty-five percent of states in sub-Saharan Africa have experienced armed conflict since independence,[1] all relying on a variety of sources to finance them, each of which shaped the character, duration and intensity of the conflict. Methods of finance can be affected by global political context, most clearly exhibited during the Cold War when a major source of rebel finance came from each superpower and their respective affiliates, shaping wars in ideological and political terms. Another source of finance, natural resources, has, arguably, shaped post-African conflicts in the greatest way: expanding the transnational effects of the conflict, affecting the physical location of the conflict and fuelling the conflict to last for longer.

Rival superpowers in the Cold War were known to offer financial support to rebels fighting against a government aligned with the enemy side. Conflicts existed under the guise of politics, acting as proxies for geo-strategic objectives; the offer of financing was exchanged for ideological commitment. To secure patronage in this context, groups had to conform, some ostensibly, to the ideological lines of communism or capitalism, yet, in most cases, simply anti-communism was sufficient for US backing. For example, UNITA was an ideologically left party, drawing on Maoist ideas, yet, it still won (intermittent) support from Washington over a shared fear of Soviet expansion.[2] Arguably, the USSR’s ideological requirement made for a superficial influence, as groups only held allegiance to Marxism-Leninism when Soviet presence (and therefore funding) was apparent; written by Bender in 1987, ‘few Angolans are fighting for, let alone familiar with, any ideology’.[3] Therefore, although rebel groups keenly sought outside patronage, the extent to which it shaped the conflicts ideologically is limited. Despite this, choosing which, if any, foreign patron to align with could worsen factional struggles, as rival leaders tried to obtain separate identities,[4] clearly seen in the ELF’s fragmentation and eventual demise. Additionally, UNITA’s acceptance of support from apartheid South Africa allowed the opposition to frame them as counter-revolutionaries, damaging their reputation with European and African states. In an attempt to justify their relationship, Savimbi insisted the South African alliance was born out of ‘desperate circumstances’ and was a ‘matter of survival’ against the Cuban-supported MPLA.[5] This shows how leaders’ dire need to finance their movements sometimes had damaging repercussions and could lend moral superiority to the other side.

Drawing on the work of Jeremy Weinstein, funding from external patrons can shape the conduct and character of a rebel group as it has an impact on the individuals attracted to join.[6] Termed the ‘information problem’, Weinstein argues that economic endowments financing a group will structure its membership by encouraging the recruitment of high-commitment ‘investors’ or less committed ‘consumers’; the type of rebels recruited can greatly affect the trajectory of the conflict.[7] ‘Consumers’ are interested in the short-term gains and immediate payoffs from participation – which can be funded by external patrons – rather than being truly dedicated to the cause. Such recruits may be further encouraged to join when opportunity cost, in terms of forgone income, is unusually low.[8] Weinstein uses the examples of the EPLF in Eritrea and the RUF insurgency in Sierra Leone to contrast the two rebel types. The EPLF abandoned foreign support in favour of self-reliance, sourcing resources from attacks on government forces, while the RUF ‘embraced wholeheartedly the support and resources provided by Charles Taylor’.[9] Thus, EPLF recruits would be ‘investors’ and those in the RUF ‘consumers’. The antithetical fates of each group appear to support Weinstein’s theory that a high number of uncommitted soldiers will eventually harm a movement irreparably. Moreover, aside from contributing to the movements demise, the membership of a group can affect its organisation and subsequently the tactics it is able to utilise. Consumer rebels are more likely to loot and kill indiscriminately, removing the strategy of selective violence which is useful for preventing civilian defection.[10] Overall, external funding available to rebel groups can actually damage their chances of success by determining the anatomy of the movement.

The end of the Cold War brought shrinking external support as African conflicts were no longer strategically relevant, forcing many rebel groups, previously reliant on the East-West tensions, to look elsewhere for funding; domestic resources were a logical place to start. The ways in which natural resource financing shapes conflict can be explored in a variety of ways. The first relates to the location of the resource extraction and its effects on the physical and human geography of the conflict. Primarily, it can intensify physical battles in and around resource rich areas. For example, major fighting took place in Kafunfo, one of the main diamond-producing regions in Angola, and other areas in the central highlands only prior to UNITA’s takeover of the diamond fields.[11] On the other hand, the type of resource used by a group can emphasise the social basis of their membership. After the 1992 elections, in an attempt to capture more of the diamond-rich areas, UNITA moved its headquarters to Humabo, a province populated Ovimbundu. Williams notes that it was crucial for UNITA to utilise Ovimbundu support in order to effectively build and protect their diamond ‘shadow economy’.[12] The shift to natural resource financing determined which territory, and thus which people, were linked with each group; ‘people … began to associate zones of Angola with a particular movement: UNITA was in Huambo, the MPLA was in Luanda’.[13] Ultimately, funding via diamonds moved the conflict from being fought over territorial identities to along lines of ethnic loyalty.[14]

Secondly, natural resources lead to what Alao terms the ‘contagious’, cross-border effect of conflict, claiming ‘all countries engaged in major conflicts involving natural resources have spread the consequences of these conflicts to their neighbours’.[15] The DRC played a key role in UNITA’s financing through both diamond exports and as a crucial supply route. As the rebels extended mining into the southern part of the DRC, they became integrated into the Congolese smuggling networks, even accounting for a portion of the country’s informal diamond output.[16] This reveals how a group’s need to finance itself through the illicit extraction and sale of diamonds can have consequences for neighbouring countries as they are exploited for their mineral wealth and consequentially become involved in the conflict. Natural resource financing can thereby shape a conflict through its supranational influence; this was especially apparent in post-colonial Africa owing to the porous borders and unclear resource boundaries after decolonisation.

Following this, financing through illegal means such as ‘blood diamonds’ has global political consequences. After UNITA became a resource-based insurgency, previous external supporters, particularly those on the UNSC, denounced the group. In 1993, the US formally recognised the MPLA as the new government of Angola drawing a line under any hope of renewed US donations. Savimbi’s need to find a ready and more reliable source of funding before the MPLA could properly consolidate authority was more important than limited American aid. Over the next few years, the UN imposed a number of sanctions – including a 1998 embargo on unofficial Angolan diamonds – intending to restrict UNITA’s profits generated from diamond revenues. Therefore, changing to a resource-funded insurgency can isolate post-colonial rebels from international assistance, which could factor into the failure of their movement. However, despite UNITA’s alienation, they continued to successfully and directly finance themselves through the worldwide diamond business, most controversially with the help of top diamond company, De Beers, showing that the control of natural resources can also attract new, indirect supporters.

Finally, natural resource financing has had the biggest influence on conflict duration; when both sides have access to resources it can greatly prolong conflict. On the contrary, conflicts in Niger and Mali have not been as long-lasting as the war in Angola because insurgent groups have not had the same revenues to sustain their struggle.[17] Moreover, rebels can become overcome by rapacity for financial benefits, protracting the conflict and beclouding pursuit of their initial goals. Klare writes of Angola, ‘in the beginning, this war was being fought over ideology and power … but by the 1990s both sides were fighting largely for control over the country’s valuable oil and diamond supplies.’[18] One can see parallels with this argument in Collier and Hoeffler’s seminal work which presents the economic interpretation of rebellion as greed-motivated.[19] Consequently, revenues can act as a disincentive to ceasefire, belligerents may prefer to fight rather than win, producing intransigence to peace attempts on account of self-interest. Yet, Angola’s UNITA is not fully congruent with this view: the long-fought civil war ended promptly after Savimbi was killed in February 2002, suggesting that their primary goal to win power had not changed to the quest for profit.
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Lastly, a dedicated diaspora can undoubtedly offer essential economic support to rebel insurgents in their homeland, exhibited by the Tamil diaspora’s contributions to the Tamil Tigers. However, the contemporary African diaspora is of comparatively recent origin – many communities emerged throughout the decolonisation period, especially in the 1990s, as a result of the violence in their home countries – thus, there is a more limited literature on their activities and contributions to post-colonial conflicts.[20] This is not to say that diaspora remittances have not shaped conflict in post-colonial Africa – in fact, Mohammad suggests they are becoming a primary source of finance for present-day African conflicts[21] – but rather that there is currently insufficient literature to form a well-grounded narrative on their role. 

Rebel insurgencies in the post-colonial period have unquestionably been shaped by the need to finance them. The attaining of funds is of highest priority to rebel leaders, allowing them to acquire arms and ammunition, support and train their recruits and ultimately maintain and strengthen the insurgency relative to the government they are trying to overthrow.[22] The source of funding is what generally changes the nature of the war; external patronage never comes with no strings attached, and natural resource financing typically prolongs and make conflicts more violent. This essay has tried to draw on the less overt ways in which financing shaped post-colonial conflicts and thus has not gone into great detail on the role of Cold War powers in on-the-ground conflict, yet these did have a great influence, especially Cuba’s interventions on side of the Soviet Union.  Moreover, how contemporary African conflicts are financed is subject to change; as shown by the end of the Cold War, when one source of financing dwindles, rebel leaders will immediately look elsewhere. With more obstacles building up against the illegal diamond and oil trade – for example, the Kimberly Process’s success in reducing trade of conflict diamonds – insurgents may start to look to the growing diaspora for assistance, which will bring its own way of shaping post-colonial conflict.


[1] Scott Straus. 2012. “Wars do end! Changing patterns of political violence in Sub-Saharan Africa”. African Affairs, 111 (443), p. 183.
[2] Justin Pearce. 2017. “Global Ideologies, Local Politics: The Cold War as Seen from Central Angola”. Journal of Southern African Studies, 43(1), p. 24.
[3] Gerald Bender. 1987. “The Eagle and the Bear in Angola”. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 489(1), p. 123.
[4] William Reno. 2011. Warfare in Independent Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 26.
[5] Pearce, “Global Ideologies”, p. 24.
[6] Jeremy Weinstein. 2005. “Resources and the Information Problem in Rebel Recruitment”. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49(4), pp. 598-623.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler. 2004. “Greed and grievance in civil war”. Oxford Economic Papers, 56(4).
[9] Weinstein, “Resources”, p. 616.
[10] Weinstein, “Resources”, p. 622.
 [11]Karl Maier. 1994. “Angola rebels face crushing offensive”. The Independent [online]. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/angola-rebels-face-c rushing-offensive-1449254.html
[12] Paul Williams. 2016. War and Conflict in Africa. 2nd Edition. (Cambridge: Polity Press), p. 99.
[13] Justin Pearce. 2012 “Control, Politics and Identity in the Angolan Civil War”. African Affairs, 111(444), p. 452.
[14]  Vasco Martins. 2015. “Ovimbundu Identity Attributions in Post-War Angola”. Journal of Southern African Studies, 41(4), p. 858.
[15] Abiodun Alao. 2007. Natural Resources and Conflict in Africa: The Tragedy of Endowment. (New York: University of Rochester Press), p. 7.
[16] Christian Dietrich. 2000. “Porous borders and diamonds”, in Jakkie Cilliers and Christian Dietrich (eds.)., Angola`s War Economy: The Role of Oil and Diamonds, (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies), p. 322.
[17] Macartan Humphreys. 2005. “Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution: Uncovering the Mechanisms”. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49(4), p. 514.
[18] Michael Klare. 2001. Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict (New York: Metropolitan Books), p, 191.
[19] Collier. “Greed and Grievance”.
[20] Abdullah Mohamoud. 2006. “African Diaspora and Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Africa” Danish Institute for International Studies, Policy Brief, p. 1.
[21] Ibid., p. 6.
[22] Weinstein, “Resources”, p. 599.