To cite this work: Ling, Katy. (2019). “How Effective Were British Intelligence in Tackling the IRA in Northern Ireland”, KatyLing.com.
P.S - Please don't plagiarise this essay... Turnitin will flag it if you do!
P.S - Please don't plagiarise this essay... Turnitin will flag it if you do!
British intelligence were generally very effective in tackling the threat from the IRA in Northern Ireland. The effectiveness of the British counterterrorism campaign during the Troubles was centred around the improved coordination of intelligence and from adapting their strategy to that of a ‘long war’. Before the effectiveness of British intelligence against the IRA can be analysed, what is meant by effectiveness in this context is outlined. Next, the chaotic few years at the start of the conflict are assessed and shown to be largely ineffective due to a lack of cultural understanding and agency rivalry. After learning from these initial inadequacies in the intelligence effort, the counterterrorism strategy became intelligence-led and much more effective. To demonstrate this, British intelligence’s methods of intelligence gathering are analysed, in particular the use of human sources and their impact of the on the IRA. Next, the inherent limitations of intelligence in relation to the overall intelligence effort are considered and finally, British intelligence’s role in the peace process of the late 1990s is used to demonstrate the security forces overall effectiveness. It must be noted that when referring to “British intelligence” in the context of the Troubles, this includes the joint effort between the core intelligence agencies – MI5, SIS and GCHQ – as well as the Army and the RUC, especially the Special Branch.
First, what makes an intelligence community effective when tackling a terrorist organisation like the IRA must be clarified. Effective counterterrorism includes preventing the group from carrying out attacks, limiting its recruitment of members and weakening the organisation internally and politically. In order to achieve this, intelligence must “deliver the strategic insight needed to know what actions will be effective and what levels of commitment are required, the tactical insight to hit the insurgent target… and the context needed to understand the broader political… effects … of security activities”.[1] Additionally, successful counterterrorism strategies display a unity of effort with the hallmarks of patience and perseverance, as well as an element of legitimacy.[2] In Northern Ireland, the overall objective of British intelligence was to neutralise the threat. The overall aim was not necessarily to eradicate the IRA, but to pacify the situation to a point where a political process could get underway and work to end the violence.
In the beginning of the conflict, British intelligence was largely ineffective in tackling the IRA and in some instances actually exacerbated the conflict by increasing the legitimacy of the IRA’s cause. Firstly, the British intelligence agencies lacked any comprehensive understanding of the context of the conflict and as such did not tailor their counter-terrorism strategy to the Northern Irish case. Such was evident in the introduction of internment without trial in 1971. Internment was largely introduced due to the success of the policy in the 1950s and 1960s against the IRA’s border campaign.[3] However, the British security forces failed to take into account how the recent outbreak of violence differed from that of the previous decade: most importantly that it had been preceded by a non-violent civil rights movement.[4] Moreover, out-dated intelligence from MI5 and the Special Branch meant that the majority of those interned were inactive or entirely innocent.[5] The revelation that the security forces had employed the ‘five techniques’ during the interrogation of 14 internees not only caused international embarrassment to the UK, but were successfully exploited by the IRA to create a hostile narrative around British interference. Writing in 1976, Lowry stated that “internment has politicised and radicalised its victims” and as such can be seen as a catalyst for IRA recruitment.[6] Thus, internment became perhaps the biggest misstep in the British response to The Troubles, serving to alienate the Catholic community and increase support for the IRA.
Further to this, in the early years the Army’s counter-terrorism strategy was rooted in their experience in colonial conflicts and as such was characterised by indiscriminate brute force and military repression. Such was evident in the events of ‘Bloody Sunday’ on 30 January 1972 in which the Army’s Parachute Regiment shot and killed fourteen unarmed anti-internment protesters. In Lord Saville’s independent report, he writes that the day’s events “strengthened the Provisional IRA, increased nationalist resentment and hostility towards the Army and exacerbated the violent conflict of the years that followed.”[7] The resultant friction between the security forces and the Catholic community was detrimental to intelligence collecting as effective counter-terrorism intelligence requires public trust and voluntary cooperation.[8] Moreover, the Army were not aided by any useful intelligence from the domestic security services. With attention and resources focused on the Cold War, MI5 were unprepared in 1969; Andrew notes that “they knew less about Belfast than they did about Nairobi”.[9] Therefore, British intelligence was ineffective in the beginning of the Troubles due to inadequate intelligence and a shallow understanding of the political intricacies of the conflict.
Another reason for the ineffectiveness of intelligence at the beginning of the conflict stems from the lack of coordination and trust between the security forces which greatly hindered the gathering of intelligence and the quality of that produced. Inter-agency rivalries plagued the security forces as shown by instances in which the Army refused the RUC access to certain documents, labelling them ‘UK Eyes Only: Not for RUC’.[10] This lack of intelligence sharing meant that the separate organisations sometimes duplicated their information gathering, leading to inefficiencies in the overall intelligence effort.[11] These circumstances also resulted in serious operational failures such as the compromising of agents and the near deaths of bomb disposal officers.[12] Further worsening the poor intelligence gathering on the IRA was the dearth of cross-border cooperation from the Irish security forces; IRA volunteers were initially allowed to cross safely over the border whilst the British Army was blocked from doing the same.[13] This lack of coordinated intelligence effort made for an ineffective response to the increasingly strong terrorist threat, and granted the IRA the time it needed to develop an effective paramilitary force. These collective failings in the initial few years of the Troubles shaped the rest of the conflict. Arguably, a more effective intelligence effort from the beginning could have reduced the impact of the IRA and the scale of the conflict in Northern Ireland.
Nevertheless, the effectiveness of British intelligence in tackling the IRA steadily improved as The Troubles drew on. Importantly, the Army and the RUC improved coordination and adapted their strategy to meet the nature of the conflict: police primacy was restored in 1976 and the Army’s omnipresence was drawn back. Crucially, the creation of tasking and co-ordination groups integrated intelligence from informers along with the activities of undercover units, linking and coordinating all of the agencies.[14] This eliminated many of the coordination problems which had previously prevented effective intelligence gathering, especially the duplication of effort and the risk of unknowingly arresting informers.[15] However, a certain level of antagonism continued to persist across the security forces and, especially from a military perspective, there appeared “no clearly-articulated strategy” which made for slow progress.[16] Although slow, lessons were continuously learned and the improved coordination and sharing of intelligence proved to be the key to British intelligence’s success in the Troubles.
Furthermore, the acknowledgement by the security forces that this was to be a ‘long war’ made their strategy more effective against the IRA. The focus switched from “decisive victories” (as clearly demonstrated by the interrogation methods used in 1972) to “patient ongoing operations” that took time to develop.[17] All in all, by the late 1970s, the British intelligence effort had reorganised into an effective mechanism for countering the increasingly professional terrorist organisation. These two themes – effective intelligence coordination and playing the long game – are recurring in the following analysis of British intelligence success against the IRA.
British intelligence used HUMINT very effectively in its fight against the IRA. HUMINT is frequently cited as the most useful method of intelligence collection against terrorist groups and the Northern Irish case upholds this view.[18] British intelligence infiltrated the IRA on a large scale, of which the effects were three-fold: terrorist plots could be thwarted; there was a high psychological impact on IRA members and the IRA had to divert more of its energy and resources to internal mole hunts. Dahl argues that “most [terrorist] plots are foiled because officials have very precise, tactical-level intelligence, often from human sources, on what the plotters are up to”.[19] With an estimated fifty informers in the IRA between 1976 and 1987,[20] the British security services were receiving this type of accurate intelligence needed to prevent planned attacks. One such thwarted attack was the IRA’s planned bombing of a parade in Gibraltar. The plots early detection and successful prevention have been linked to a tip-off from the infamous IRA informer code named ‘Stakeknife” (although for security and secrecy reasons this has never been confirmed).[21] Therefore, HUMINT in the form of informers and undercover agents was an effective means of preventing IRA attacks.
Another effect of having a strong network of informers and agents within the IRA, was the psychological effects on the terrorist organisation. Sean O’Callaghan, an informer, affirmed that hardly a week went by without an informer scare within the IRA, creating an atmosphere of heightened paranoia and distrust.[22] This demonstrates how much time and energy went towards internal mole hunting. Emblematic of this was the aftermath of the ‘super-grass’ trials which, although not entirely successful due to the number of overturned convictions, caused chaos within the IRA and led to the assassination of any suspected informers. Moreover, British intelligence’s success in pre-empting and preventing IRA attacks undermined the organisation’s morale by making the group’s entire existence seem a waste of time and its actions self-defeating.[23] For example, the Loughgall ambush resulted in eight IRA members being killed by the SAS – the largest loss of terrorist life during the Troubles – after British intelligence uncovered a planned attack on Loughgall police station. The IRA recognised that the accuracy of British intelligence in this scenario suggested that some form of insider knowledge was provided to the security services. The resultant internal inquiries and mistrust made the IRA extremely cautious, reducing their activity for many months and no attack of the same scale followed for more than two years.[24] Therefore, the ability to recruit a high number of informers was effective in tackling the IRA as it made the group increasingly inward looking and suspicious which diverted their time and resources away from their primary cause.
Despite the strategies effectiveness, controversy has arisen over the use of informers and agents in the IRA. After the reorganisation of the IRA into a cellular structure in the late 1970s, the security forces had to be cautious of acting on specific intelligence to avoid the source being easily traceable.[25] Allegations have arisen against the security forces that numerous attacks were known about in advance but went ahead to safeguard the identities of those working for British intelligence. Notwithstanding, one can see how permitting informers to continue terrorist activities was an effective strategy for combating the IRA. In terms of the ‘long war’, the cultivation and maintenance of human sources with close links to the IRA was pertinent to success. To act on each piece of information would provide a high risk to the source and rapidly destroy what could have been years’ worth of intelligence work. Indeed, sitting on information and allowing it to build up is one of the main differences between counter-terrorism intelligence and criminal police work. By “continuing to watch”, necessary details surrounding the IRA’s activities, personnel and plans could be amalgamated and used to a more effective end in a later operation.[26]
In terms of the ethicality of the security forces’ methods, Finegan posits that the “response was most effective whenever it crossed the boundaries of the criminal justice model”.[27] However, as with the dubious interrogation techniques used at the start of the conflict, poor public perception can damage the effectiveness of an intelligence effort. The intelligence community balanced the effects of the potential public backlash with the effectiveness of maintaining informers and in this instance the latter outweighed the former. The purpose of this essay is not to discuss the ethical dilemma surrounding the use of such covert methods, and if looking at it from an efficacy perspective, the maintenance of an informer network within the IRA proved to be an effective strategy against the IRA.
Other than informants, HUMINT was acquired from constant surveillance, observation and interaction with members of the public. Plain clothes police officers, foot patrols and a highly observant security force helped to build up a wealth of low-grade intelligence. Identifying terrorist activity is made the more difficult due to terrorists ability to operate covertly in clandestine networks and hide amongst the general public. To overcome these challenges, the security forces had to have a ‘familiarity with what is normal’ in order to detect ‘anomalous behaviour’.[28] The move to police primacy helped to achieve this. Ulsterisation transferred responsibility for counter-terrorism operations to the Northern Irish authorities which returned credence to localised knowledge of which has frequently been cited as essential for successful counterterrorism.[29] Knowing communities, families and specific faces was fundamental in the fight against the IRA due to the conflicts intimately domestic context. In sum, HUMINT was successfully used in Northern Ireland to gather a large volume of information that had the potential to harm the IRA.
To be effective, counter-terrorism campaigns must be an “all source effort”.[30] Although intelligence from human sources was the most valuable source of intelligence during the Troubles, it had inherent risks and needed to be validated to ensure the reliability of the information. Accordingly, technical and signals intelligence also contributed to the effective British intelligence effort, and steadily improved as capabilities expanded over the three decades. The importance of technical surveillance during the Troubles has perhaps been overlooked in favour of researching HUMINT operations. One author described the situation in Northern Ireland as “an invisible cage of electronic…surveillance” and compared it to Orwell’s 1984.[31] Listening devices, phone tapping, concealed cameras and more sophisticated methods such as helicopter live-feeds all gathered critical intelligence.[32] These methods helped to piece together a more complete picture of IRA members and their networks, and worked to complement the tactical intelligence provided by human sources.
Perhaps more importantly, British intelligence effectively utilised their growing technological capabilities in analysing and collating the masses of information which was not useful on its own. The unity in effort between the various branches of British intelligence was crucial in turning this raw information into effective and active intelligence. Computer databases helped to bring gathered intelligence from across the agencies into one system.[33] The building up of profiles of dissident Republicans into one accessible system certainly eased the intelligence service’s job and produced deeper insight into the IRA’s intentions and capabilities. The manpower requirements taken to develop these databases was a serious investment of time and resources, and thus is another example of the security forces’ commitment to the long game in Northern Ireland.[34] in this sense, the use British intelligence’s technological capabilities was strategically effective in the fight against the IRA.
When evaluating British intelligence’s effectiveness in tackling the IRA, one must be aware of the inherent limitations of intelligence, especially in the context of counterterrorism. Betts’ “enemies of intelligence” include human, situational and organisational problems which limit the success of intelligence agencies.[35] Although some of these limitations can be improved and reformed, some are inherent to intelligence and as such failure is inevitable.[36] In a protracted fight against a determined and committed organisation like the IRA, expectations must be managed and it be acknowledged that intelligence agencies do not have the capacity to prevent all terrorist attacks. The statement given by the IRA after the 1984 bombings in Brighton sums this up: “Today we were unlucky, but remember, we only have to be lucky once; you will have to be lucky always.”[37] British intelligence was not ‘lucky always’, and certainly some spectacular attacks with a high number of casualties were carried out by the IRA. Nevertheless, these failures do not negate from the overall effectiveness of the intelligence machinery in Northern Ireland. Counter-terrorism campaigns cannot be measured in adversary casualties or material destroyed; they do not produce quantifiable military results.[38] Instead, the way in which British intelligence successfully neutralised the conflict to a state in which political negotiating could take place demonstrates that it was effective.
The culmination of British intelligence’s effectiveness in Northern Ireland is shown in how they were able to neutralise the threat from the IRA to a level where political negotiation and reconciliation talks could take place. The position in which the IRA found themselves in in the mid-1990s was one of stalemate, and was in large part down to British intelligence’s concerted effort in blocking the IRA at every turn. Finegan describes the IRA’s position at this time as “effectively checkmated by security force counter measures”.[39] Indeed, the number of attacks had declined and volunteer numbers were dwindling. In this sense, the patient operational and tactical level intelligence operations were effective in pushing towards the broader strategy of ending the violence and bringing the IRA to the negotiating table. British intelligence effectively created the conditions in which the IRA realised they would not win through a primarily violent strategy and in turn allowed the peace process to proceed without significant intimidation.[40] With regards to the ongoing problems in Northern Ireland today, Edwards has queried the success of Britain’s counter-terrorist strategy “in ending this brand of terrorism”.[41] However, tackling the underlying cause of the Troubles – ideology, disillusionment and relative deprivation – was never the job of the intelligence services. The intelligence effort brought about the situation whereby the Good Friday Agreement could be negotiated and the subsequent ending of the IRA’s armed campaign and as such it was effective.
Overall, the joint British intelligence effort coordinated by the Security Service, the Army and the police was effective in tackling the IRA. It was tactically and operationally effective in gathering intelligence on the IRA and consequently in disrupting and frustrating the terrorist campaign. Moreover, in the long-term it proved to be strategically effective by providing an environment in which political efforts could take over to try and resolve the conflict. As the conflict drew on, the intelligence-led campaign became more sophisticated and learned from its past mistakes. No counter-terrorism campaign can ever be without its failures, and various successful IRA attacks as well as the ethical controversy over some of the methods used can be considered as such. However, when taking a holistic view of British intelligence throughout the Troubles, it can be seen as very effective.
[1] Brian Jackson (2007) “Counterinsurgency Intelligence in a “Long War”: The British Experience in Northern Ireland”, RAND Corporation, p.75.
[2] David Whittaker (2012) The Terrorism Reader (Oxon: Routledge) p.326.
[3] Andrew Sanders (2011) “Northern Ireland: The Intelligence War 1969–75”, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 13, p.241.
[4] David Lowry (1976) “Internment: Detention Without Trial in Northern Ireland”, Human Rights, 5(3), p.276.
[5] Sanders, Intelligence War, p.242.
[6] Lowry, Internment, p.276.
[7] Lord Saville (2010) Principal Conclusions and Overall Assessment of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry (London: HMSO), p. 58.
[8] Jackson, Counterinsurgency, p.79.
[9] Gauelle Faure (2009) “Author Christopher Andrew on MI5's Secrets”, TIME. http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1928963,00.html
[10] Jackson, Counterinsurgency, p.76.
[11] Ibid., p.76.
[12] Jackson, Counterinsurgency, p.76
[13] Sanders, Intelligence War, pp.239-245
[14] Mark Urban (1992) Big Boys' Rules: The SAS and the Secret Struggle Against the IRA (London: Faber and Faber), p. 95.
[15] Ibid., p.95.
[16] Ministry of Defence (2006) An Analysis of Military Operations in Northern Ireland (DGS Publications Coordinator: London) p.8-3.
[17] Rory Finegan (2016) “Shadowboxing in the Dark: Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism in Northern Ireland”, Terrorism and Political Violence, 28(3), p.511.
[18] Erik Dahl (2011) “The Plots that Failed: Intelligence Lessons Learned from Unsuccessful Terrorist Attacks Against the United States”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 34(8).
[19] Ibid., p. 635.
[20] Urban, SAS, p.244.
[21] Ciar Byrne (2003) “How Stakeknife was unmasked”, The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/media/2003/may/12/pressandpublishing.northernireland2 [online]
[22] Sean O’Callaghan (1999) The Informer (London: Corgi Books) p.172.
[23] Michael Kirk-Smith & James Dingley (2009) “Countering terrorism in Northern Ireland: The Role of intelligence, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 20(3-4), p. 556.
[24] Ministry of Defence, Military Operations, p.8-10.
[25] Bradley Bamford (2005) “The Role and Effectiveness of Intelligence in Northern Ireland”, Intelligence and National Security, 20(4), p.592.
[26] Jackson, Counterinsurgency, p.82.
[27] Finegan, Shadowboxing, p. 507.
[28] Jackson, Counterinsurgency, p.77.
[29] Marilyn Peterson (2005) Intelligence-Led Policing (Washington: Department of Justice); Erik Dahl (2010) “Intelligence and Terrorism”, in The International Studies Encyclopaedia, ed. Robert Denemark and Renée Marlin-Bennett (London: Wiley-Blackwell) [online].
[30] David Charters (2009) “Counter-insurgency Intelligence: The Evolution of British Theory and Practice”, The Journal of Conflict Studies, 29, p.67.
[31] Tony Geraghty (1998) The Irish War: The Hidden Conflict Between the IRA and British Intelligence (London: Harper Collins) p.74.
[32] Jackson, Counterinsurgency, p.80.
[33] Jackson, Counterinsurgency, p.80.
[34] Ibid., p.81.
[35] Richard Betts (2007) Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security (Columbia: Columbia University).
[36] Ibid.
[37] Peter Taylor (2002) Brits: The War Against the IRA (London: Bloomsbury) p.265.
[38] Jackson, Counterinsurgency, p.84.
[39] Finegan, Shadowboxing, p.511.
[40] Ministry of Defence, Military Operations, p. 8-3.
[41] Aaron Edwards (2012) “Lessons Learnt: Dissident Irish Republicans and British Security”, Arts and Humanities Research Council, 6, p.12.
First, what makes an intelligence community effective when tackling a terrorist organisation like the IRA must be clarified. Effective counterterrorism includes preventing the group from carrying out attacks, limiting its recruitment of members and weakening the organisation internally and politically. In order to achieve this, intelligence must “deliver the strategic insight needed to know what actions will be effective and what levels of commitment are required, the tactical insight to hit the insurgent target… and the context needed to understand the broader political… effects … of security activities”.[1] Additionally, successful counterterrorism strategies display a unity of effort with the hallmarks of patience and perseverance, as well as an element of legitimacy.[2] In Northern Ireland, the overall objective of British intelligence was to neutralise the threat. The overall aim was not necessarily to eradicate the IRA, but to pacify the situation to a point where a political process could get underway and work to end the violence.
In the beginning of the conflict, British intelligence was largely ineffective in tackling the IRA and in some instances actually exacerbated the conflict by increasing the legitimacy of the IRA’s cause. Firstly, the British intelligence agencies lacked any comprehensive understanding of the context of the conflict and as such did not tailor their counter-terrorism strategy to the Northern Irish case. Such was evident in the introduction of internment without trial in 1971. Internment was largely introduced due to the success of the policy in the 1950s and 1960s against the IRA’s border campaign.[3] However, the British security forces failed to take into account how the recent outbreak of violence differed from that of the previous decade: most importantly that it had been preceded by a non-violent civil rights movement.[4] Moreover, out-dated intelligence from MI5 and the Special Branch meant that the majority of those interned were inactive or entirely innocent.[5] The revelation that the security forces had employed the ‘five techniques’ during the interrogation of 14 internees not only caused international embarrassment to the UK, but were successfully exploited by the IRA to create a hostile narrative around British interference. Writing in 1976, Lowry stated that “internment has politicised and radicalised its victims” and as such can be seen as a catalyst for IRA recruitment.[6] Thus, internment became perhaps the biggest misstep in the British response to The Troubles, serving to alienate the Catholic community and increase support for the IRA.
Further to this, in the early years the Army’s counter-terrorism strategy was rooted in their experience in colonial conflicts and as such was characterised by indiscriminate brute force and military repression. Such was evident in the events of ‘Bloody Sunday’ on 30 January 1972 in which the Army’s Parachute Regiment shot and killed fourteen unarmed anti-internment protesters. In Lord Saville’s independent report, he writes that the day’s events “strengthened the Provisional IRA, increased nationalist resentment and hostility towards the Army and exacerbated the violent conflict of the years that followed.”[7] The resultant friction between the security forces and the Catholic community was detrimental to intelligence collecting as effective counter-terrorism intelligence requires public trust and voluntary cooperation.[8] Moreover, the Army were not aided by any useful intelligence from the domestic security services. With attention and resources focused on the Cold War, MI5 were unprepared in 1969; Andrew notes that “they knew less about Belfast than they did about Nairobi”.[9] Therefore, British intelligence was ineffective in the beginning of the Troubles due to inadequate intelligence and a shallow understanding of the political intricacies of the conflict.
Another reason for the ineffectiveness of intelligence at the beginning of the conflict stems from the lack of coordination and trust between the security forces which greatly hindered the gathering of intelligence and the quality of that produced. Inter-agency rivalries plagued the security forces as shown by instances in which the Army refused the RUC access to certain documents, labelling them ‘UK Eyes Only: Not for RUC’.[10] This lack of intelligence sharing meant that the separate organisations sometimes duplicated their information gathering, leading to inefficiencies in the overall intelligence effort.[11] These circumstances also resulted in serious operational failures such as the compromising of agents and the near deaths of bomb disposal officers.[12] Further worsening the poor intelligence gathering on the IRA was the dearth of cross-border cooperation from the Irish security forces; IRA volunteers were initially allowed to cross safely over the border whilst the British Army was blocked from doing the same.[13] This lack of coordinated intelligence effort made for an ineffective response to the increasingly strong terrorist threat, and granted the IRA the time it needed to develop an effective paramilitary force. These collective failings in the initial few years of the Troubles shaped the rest of the conflict. Arguably, a more effective intelligence effort from the beginning could have reduced the impact of the IRA and the scale of the conflict in Northern Ireland.
Nevertheless, the effectiveness of British intelligence in tackling the IRA steadily improved as The Troubles drew on. Importantly, the Army and the RUC improved coordination and adapted their strategy to meet the nature of the conflict: police primacy was restored in 1976 and the Army’s omnipresence was drawn back. Crucially, the creation of tasking and co-ordination groups integrated intelligence from informers along with the activities of undercover units, linking and coordinating all of the agencies.[14] This eliminated many of the coordination problems which had previously prevented effective intelligence gathering, especially the duplication of effort and the risk of unknowingly arresting informers.[15] However, a certain level of antagonism continued to persist across the security forces and, especially from a military perspective, there appeared “no clearly-articulated strategy” which made for slow progress.[16] Although slow, lessons were continuously learned and the improved coordination and sharing of intelligence proved to be the key to British intelligence’s success in the Troubles.
Furthermore, the acknowledgement by the security forces that this was to be a ‘long war’ made their strategy more effective against the IRA. The focus switched from “decisive victories” (as clearly demonstrated by the interrogation methods used in 1972) to “patient ongoing operations” that took time to develop.[17] All in all, by the late 1970s, the British intelligence effort had reorganised into an effective mechanism for countering the increasingly professional terrorist organisation. These two themes – effective intelligence coordination and playing the long game – are recurring in the following analysis of British intelligence success against the IRA.
British intelligence used HUMINT very effectively in its fight against the IRA. HUMINT is frequently cited as the most useful method of intelligence collection against terrorist groups and the Northern Irish case upholds this view.[18] British intelligence infiltrated the IRA on a large scale, of which the effects were three-fold: terrorist plots could be thwarted; there was a high psychological impact on IRA members and the IRA had to divert more of its energy and resources to internal mole hunts. Dahl argues that “most [terrorist] plots are foiled because officials have very precise, tactical-level intelligence, often from human sources, on what the plotters are up to”.[19] With an estimated fifty informers in the IRA between 1976 and 1987,[20] the British security services were receiving this type of accurate intelligence needed to prevent planned attacks. One such thwarted attack was the IRA’s planned bombing of a parade in Gibraltar. The plots early detection and successful prevention have been linked to a tip-off from the infamous IRA informer code named ‘Stakeknife” (although for security and secrecy reasons this has never been confirmed).[21] Therefore, HUMINT in the form of informers and undercover agents was an effective means of preventing IRA attacks.
Another effect of having a strong network of informers and agents within the IRA, was the psychological effects on the terrorist organisation. Sean O’Callaghan, an informer, affirmed that hardly a week went by without an informer scare within the IRA, creating an atmosphere of heightened paranoia and distrust.[22] This demonstrates how much time and energy went towards internal mole hunting. Emblematic of this was the aftermath of the ‘super-grass’ trials which, although not entirely successful due to the number of overturned convictions, caused chaos within the IRA and led to the assassination of any suspected informers. Moreover, British intelligence’s success in pre-empting and preventing IRA attacks undermined the organisation’s morale by making the group’s entire existence seem a waste of time and its actions self-defeating.[23] For example, the Loughgall ambush resulted in eight IRA members being killed by the SAS – the largest loss of terrorist life during the Troubles – after British intelligence uncovered a planned attack on Loughgall police station. The IRA recognised that the accuracy of British intelligence in this scenario suggested that some form of insider knowledge was provided to the security services. The resultant internal inquiries and mistrust made the IRA extremely cautious, reducing their activity for many months and no attack of the same scale followed for more than two years.[24] Therefore, the ability to recruit a high number of informers was effective in tackling the IRA as it made the group increasingly inward looking and suspicious which diverted their time and resources away from their primary cause.
Despite the strategies effectiveness, controversy has arisen over the use of informers and agents in the IRA. After the reorganisation of the IRA into a cellular structure in the late 1970s, the security forces had to be cautious of acting on specific intelligence to avoid the source being easily traceable.[25] Allegations have arisen against the security forces that numerous attacks were known about in advance but went ahead to safeguard the identities of those working for British intelligence. Notwithstanding, one can see how permitting informers to continue terrorist activities was an effective strategy for combating the IRA. In terms of the ‘long war’, the cultivation and maintenance of human sources with close links to the IRA was pertinent to success. To act on each piece of information would provide a high risk to the source and rapidly destroy what could have been years’ worth of intelligence work. Indeed, sitting on information and allowing it to build up is one of the main differences between counter-terrorism intelligence and criminal police work. By “continuing to watch”, necessary details surrounding the IRA’s activities, personnel and plans could be amalgamated and used to a more effective end in a later operation.[26]
In terms of the ethicality of the security forces’ methods, Finegan posits that the “response was most effective whenever it crossed the boundaries of the criminal justice model”.[27] However, as with the dubious interrogation techniques used at the start of the conflict, poor public perception can damage the effectiveness of an intelligence effort. The intelligence community balanced the effects of the potential public backlash with the effectiveness of maintaining informers and in this instance the latter outweighed the former. The purpose of this essay is not to discuss the ethical dilemma surrounding the use of such covert methods, and if looking at it from an efficacy perspective, the maintenance of an informer network within the IRA proved to be an effective strategy against the IRA.
Other than informants, HUMINT was acquired from constant surveillance, observation and interaction with members of the public. Plain clothes police officers, foot patrols and a highly observant security force helped to build up a wealth of low-grade intelligence. Identifying terrorist activity is made the more difficult due to terrorists ability to operate covertly in clandestine networks and hide amongst the general public. To overcome these challenges, the security forces had to have a ‘familiarity with what is normal’ in order to detect ‘anomalous behaviour’.[28] The move to police primacy helped to achieve this. Ulsterisation transferred responsibility for counter-terrorism operations to the Northern Irish authorities which returned credence to localised knowledge of which has frequently been cited as essential for successful counterterrorism.[29] Knowing communities, families and specific faces was fundamental in the fight against the IRA due to the conflicts intimately domestic context. In sum, HUMINT was successfully used in Northern Ireland to gather a large volume of information that had the potential to harm the IRA.
To be effective, counter-terrorism campaigns must be an “all source effort”.[30] Although intelligence from human sources was the most valuable source of intelligence during the Troubles, it had inherent risks and needed to be validated to ensure the reliability of the information. Accordingly, technical and signals intelligence also contributed to the effective British intelligence effort, and steadily improved as capabilities expanded over the three decades. The importance of technical surveillance during the Troubles has perhaps been overlooked in favour of researching HUMINT operations. One author described the situation in Northern Ireland as “an invisible cage of electronic…surveillance” and compared it to Orwell’s 1984.[31] Listening devices, phone tapping, concealed cameras and more sophisticated methods such as helicopter live-feeds all gathered critical intelligence.[32] These methods helped to piece together a more complete picture of IRA members and their networks, and worked to complement the tactical intelligence provided by human sources.
Perhaps more importantly, British intelligence effectively utilised their growing technological capabilities in analysing and collating the masses of information which was not useful on its own. The unity in effort between the various branches of British intelligence was crucial in turning this raw information into effective and active intelligence. Computer databases helped to bring gathered intelligence from across the agencies into one system.[33] The building up of profiles of dissident Republicans into one accessible system certainly eased the intelligence service’s job and produced deeper insight into the IRA’s intentions and capabilities. The manpower requirements taken to develop these databases was a serious investment of time and resources, and thus is another example of the security forces’ commitment to the long game in Northern Ireland.[34] in this sense, the use British intelligence’s technological capabilities was strategically effective in the fight against the IRA.
When evaluating British intelligence’s effectiveness in tackling the IRA, one must be aware of the inherent limitations of intelligence, especially in the context of counterterrorism. Betts’ “enemies of intelligence” include human, situational and organisational problems which limit the success of intelligence agencies.[35] Although some of these limitations can be improved and reformed, some are inherent to intelligence and as such failure is inevitable.[36] In a protracted fight against a determined and committed organisation like the IRA, expectations must be managed and it be acknowledged that intelligence agencies do not have the capacity to prevent all terrorist attacks. The statement given by the IRA after the 1984 bombings in Brighton sums this up: “Today we were unlucky, but remember, we only have to be lucky once; you will have to be lucky always.”[37] British intelligence was not ‘lucky always’, and certainly some spectacular attacks with a high number of casualties were carried out by the IRA. Nevertheless, these failures do not negate from the overall effectiveness of the intelligence machinery in Northern Ireland. Counter-terrorism campaigns cannot be measured in adversary casualties or material destroyed; they do not produce quantifiable military results.[38] Instead, the way in which British intelligence successfully neutralised the conflict to a state in which political negotiating could take place demonstrates that it was effective.
The culmination of British intelligence’s effectiveness in Northern Ireland is shown in how they were able to neutralise the threat from the IRA to a level where political negotiation and reconciliation talks could take place. The position in which the IRA found themselves in in the mid-1990s was one of stalemate, and was in large part down to British intelligence’s concerted effort in blocking the IRA at every turn. Finegan describes the IRA’s position at this time as “effectively checkmated by security force counter measures”.[39] Indeed, the number of attacks had declined and volunteer numbers were dwindling. In this sense, the patient operational and tactical level intelligence operations were effective in pushing towards the broader strategy of ending the violence and bringing the IRA to the negotiating table. British intelligence effectively created the conditions in which the IRA realised they would not win through a primarily violent strategy and in turn allowed the peace process to proceed without significant intimidation.[40] With regards to the ongoing problems in Northern Ireland today, Edwards has queried the success of Britain’s counter-terrorist strategy “in ending this brand of terrorism”.[41] However, tackling the underlying cause of the Troubles – ideology, disillusionment and relative deprivation – was never the job of the intelligence services. The intelligence effort brought about the situation whereby the Good Friday Agreement could be negotiated and the subsequent ending of the IRA’s armed campaign and as such it was effective.
Overall, the joint British intelligence effort coordinated by the Security Service, the Army and the police was effective in tackling the IRA. It was tactically and operationally effective in gathering intelligence on the IRA and consequently in disrupting and frustrating the terrorist campaign. Moreover, in the long-term it proved to be strategically effective by providing an environment in which political efforts could take over to try and resolve the conflict. As the conflict drew on, the intelligence-led campaign became more sophisticated and learned from its past mistakes. No counter-terrorism campaign can ever be without its failures, and various successful IRA attacks as well as the ethical controversy over some of the methods used can be considered as such. However, when taking a holistic view of British intelligence throughout the Troubles, it can be seen as very effective.
[1] Brian Jackson (2007) “Counterinsurgency Intelligence in a “Long War”: The British Experience in Northern Ireland”, RAND Corporation, p.75.
[2] David Whittaker (2012) The Terrorism Reader (Oxon: Routledge) p.326.
[3] Andrew Sanders (2011) “Northern Ireland: The Intelligence War 1969–75”, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 13, p.241.
[4] David Lowry (1976) “Internment: Detention Without Trial in Northern Ireland”, Human Rights, 5(3), p.276.
[5] Sanders, Intelligence War, p.242.
[6] Lowry, Internment, p.276.
[7] Lord Saville (2010) Principal Conclusions and Overall Assessment of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry (London: HMSO), p. 58.
[8] Jackson, Counterinsurgency, p.79.
[9] Gauelle Faure (2009) “Author Christopher Andrew on MI5's Secrets”, TIME. http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1928963,00.html
[10] Jackson, Counterinsurgency, p.76.
[11] Ibid., p.76.
[12] Jackson, Counterinsurgency, p.76
[13] Sanders, Intelligence War, pp.239-245
[14] Mark Urban (1992) Big Boys' Rules: The SAS and the Secret Struggle Against the IRA (London: Faber and Faber), p. 95.
[15] Ibid., p.95.
[16] Ministry of Defence (2006) An Analysis of Military Operations in Northern Ireland (DGS Publications Coordinator: London) p.8-3.
[17] Rory Finegan (2016) “Shadowboxing in the Dark: Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism in Northern Ireland”, Terrorism and Political Violence, 28(3), p.511.
[18] Erik Dahl (2011) “The Plots that Failed: Intelligence Lessons Learned from Unsuccessful Terrorist Attacks Against the United States”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 34(8).
[19] Ibid., p. 635.
[20] Urban, SAS, p.244.
[21] Ciar Byrne (2003) “How Stakeknife was unmasked”, The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/media/2003/may/12/pressandpublishing.northernireland2 [online]
[22] Sean O’Callaghan (1999) The Informer (London: Corgi Books) p.172.
[23] Michael Kirk-Smith & James Dingley (2009) “Countering terrorism in Northern Ireland: The Role of intelligence, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 20(3-4), p. 556.
[24] Ministry of Defence, Military Operations, p.8-10.
[25] Bradley Bamford (2005) “The Role and Effectiveness of Intelligence in Northern Ireland”, Intelligence and National Security, 20(4), p.592.
[26] Jackson, Counterinsurgency, p.82.
[27] Finegan, Shadowboxing, p. 507.
[28] Jackson, Counterinsurgency, p.77.
[29] Marilyn Peterson (2005) Intelligence-Led Policing (Washington: Department of Justice); Erik Dahl (2010) “Intelligence and Terrorism”, in The International Studies Encyclopaedia, ed. Robert Denemark and Renée Marlin-Bennett (London: Wiley-Blackwell) [online].
[30] David Charters (2009) “Counter-insurgency Intelligence: The Evolution of British Theory and Practice”, The Journal of Conflict Studies, 29, p.67.
[31] Tony Geraghty (1998) The Irish War: The Hidden Conflict Between the IRA and British Intelligence (London: Harper Collins) p.74.
[32] Jackson, Counterinsurgency, p.80.
[33] Jackson, Counterinsurgency, p.80.
[34] Ibid., p.81.
[35] Richard Betts (2007) Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security (Columbia: Columbia University).
[36] Ibid.
[37] Peter Taylor (2002) Brits: The War Against the IRA (London: Bloomsbury) p.265.
[38] Jackson, Counterinsurgency, p.84.
[39] Finegan, Shadowboxing, p.511.
[40] Ministry of Defence, Military Operations, p. 8-3.
[41] Aaron Edwards (2012) “Lessons Learnt: Dissident Irish Republicans and British Security”, Arts and Humanities Research Council, 6, p.12.